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Abstract 
Security awareness and its implementation within an organisation is crucial for preventing deliberate 
attacks or/and minimise system failures on organisation’s system especially where critical 
infrastructure is involved including energy, water, gas and etc. This study is based on Integrated 
System Theory (IST) and focuses on measuring and assessing security goals including policies, risk 
management, internal control and contingency management implemented in 101 organisations that 
operate Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems. The data collected were 
analysed using structural equation modelling to test the structural and measurement model. The 
major finding of this study is that organisational information security goals are strongly related to the 
key measurement indicators, which include items assessing security policies, risk management, 
internal controls and contingency management. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The nature of interconnected and complex infrastructures critical infrastructure invites an array of 
risks and threats to these critical systems. Any risks or threats to these critical services will cause a 
substantial impact on the critical services provided energy, water, gas, transportation, emergency 
services, food, etc.  
In the United States, the Executive Order on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) by President 
George W. Bush in 2001 emphasized the continuous efforts to secure information systems for critical 
infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that 
support such systems. Protecting these systems is essential to the telecommunications, energy, 
financial services, manufacturing, water, transportation, health care, and emergency services sectors 
(The White House 2001, pp.1-10). Critical infrastructures systems are created on a huge scale and are 
often interdependent and interconnected. A failure of any components in the critical infrastructure 
may result in the collapse of services and organisational coherence (Chunlei et al. 2011). Its complex 
nature makes it difficult to identify the dynamic behaviours of critical infrastructure sectors, but 
significant research has been done on mitigating risks to them. Several similarities were identified in 
the critical infrastructure systems, which are typically complex arrangements. They include cascading 
failures of interrelated infrastructures, for example, the failure of an electric company could 
eventually affect the whole infrastructure such as airports, transportation, telephone systems, etc. It is 
also difficult to determine boundaries between each infrastructure. Complex systems may be open and 
nested and any failure of an infrastructure could cause dangerous phenomena to appear elsewhere in 
the system (Cilliers, 2002).  
According to Hentea (2008), a typical SCADA network layout comprises workstations, SCADA 
servers, Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), Port servers, 
workstations, as well as communication links that unite SCADA internal systems to any Corporate 
LAN. Hentea also noted that the following components that make up SCADA systems consist of: 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), remote terminal units (RTU), intelligent electronic device 
(IED) or Process Automation Controller (PAC). Host computers are used as central points of 
interaction between people, databases and monitoring processes and creation of reports (Hentea, 
2008). Figure 1 below illustrates a typical SCADA network as reported in the Industrial Control 
Systems Weekly Situational Awareness Report by the Critical Intelligence (Critical Intelligence Inc 
2013). The layers in the figure illustrate how hardware and components are connected and interacts 
with one another. The sensors, actuators, PLC and RTUs are located at the remote locations to collect 
data. The SCADA layer consists of HMI, Historian, Engineering and other workstations. Historian is 
a subsystem that stores all the audit-logs of the activities conducted on SCADA systems (Mcnamee & 
Elliott 2011). Demilitarised Zones (DMZ) protect the SCADA systems from the corporate layer and 
the Internet if configured properly. This is achieved by ensuring secure access authentication devices, 
workstations, servers and databases.  
  
Figure 1: Typical structure and components in a Critical Infrastructure Environment 
(Adapted from Critical Intelligence, 2013) 
 
There are different types of interruptions that can affect SCADA systems, in the form of either 
deliberate attacks or system failure. Both cause many problems for an organisation. An example of 
such failure of SCADA systems was an incident in Bellingham WA Gas Pipeline failed because the 
control systems did not function during database development on the pipes systems while the pipes 
were in operation. Because of this failure 237,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from a 16” pipeline that 
ignited and burned nearly 1½ miles along the local creek causing 3 deaths and 8 injuries (Ismail et al. 
2014a; Miller & Rowe 2012; Tsang 2009).  
This paper seeks to measure the information security goals within an SCADA systems organisation 
and the extent to which organisations are aware and implement information security mechanisms. 
Section 2 will briefly introduce the conceptual background of the study by highlighting the SCADA 
systems’ vulnerabilities, and followed by a description of the theories often used in assessing security 
in organisations and the reasons for choosing Integrated System Theory for this research. Section 3 
discusses the research methodology and respondents’ demographics details that constitute much of the 
data collected. This is followed by section 4, which focuses on the data analysis and results of that 
analysis. This includes the assessments of the measurement and structural models adopted for this 
research. Section 5 concentrates mainly on a discussion of the data analysis. Finally, section 6 
concludes the study. 
 
 
 
 
 2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
   
2.1 SCADA Systems Vulnerabilities  
The growing demands for connectivity between corporate networks and SCADA systems have 
created the risks and introduced vulnerabilities. Private and confidential information is widely 
accessible to the public as well as individuals and corporations on the Internet, including structural 
maps networks, network systems configurations and names, etc. By obtaining this information, an 
intruder can then access and manipulate the SCADA systems for their own benefit. Insecure network 
designs may result from insufficient funds or lack of knowledge of the practitioners of the system 
(Fernandez & Fernandez 2005).  
Research has shown that there are several vulnerabilities associated particularly with SCADA 
systems. SCADA systems have similar vulnerabilities with existing IT systems (Hildick-Smith, 
2005), but due to their unique nature, there are exclusive vulnerabilities including: SCADA engineers’ 
experiences are unlike those of IT personnel and the reality is they need to complement each other’s 
tasks and skills in securing SCADA systems. In a normal IT organisation’s operations, security 
patches are often deployed on the system regularly, but in SCADA organisations, the system would 
not be able to be patched rigorously due to its highly critical data and the requirement to be available 
without any interruptions.  From the literature, as well as the interviews conducted with experts and 
SCADA practitioners (Ismail et al. 2014b), the use of a shared password by engineers operating the 
SCADA systems on the same site is a normal practise in order to ease day-to-day operations. This, 
however, creates risks especially in terms of authentication and accountability. Policies such as access 
control should be enforced in order to avoid unauthorised access to the critical systems. With 
increasing connections between remote locations, sites and offices sharing information can lead to 
vulnerabilities in the system. For reasons of cost and economic efficiency, engineers or SCADA 
practitioners should be able to remotely access systems and conduct their day to day operations 
without being physically at the remote locations. Due to the large amount of data involved in 
monitoring and controlling SCADA systems, real-time monitoring is another growing concern 
(Hildick-Smith, 2005; Rautmare, 2011). 
According to Ismail, Sitnikova and Slay (2014a) and (Miller & Rowe 2012), a series of deliberate 
previous attacks has been directed at SCADA systems in order to gain confidential information, or 
access private networks and to deliberately cause denial of service. This can cause financial, 
economic and human loss. This paper recognizes the importance of assessing the security within 
SCADA organisations in order to prevent attacks or failure of their crucial services.  
 
 
2.2 Relevance of Integrated System Theory (IST) 
 
Within the SCADA systems environment, many studies have been conducted in assessing the 
vulnerabilities and risks organisations face, based on several theories such as, Integrated System 
Theory (Hong et al. 2003), Security Life Cycle Model (Creery & Byres 2007), Protection Motivation 
Theory (Workman et al. 2008), Institutional Theory (Bjork, 2004; Meyer, 2006) and  Information 
Security Management Theory (Ericsson, 2010; Finne, 1998). An unconventional theory that applies 
theories across various sectors has also been applied to security risk assessments, and this is the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions (Sun et al. 2006). In the case of SCADA systems and its 
complex nature, we believe that an integrated solution theory would be more applicable since it will 
cover all the important considerations within the SCADA environment.   
This study adopts Integrated System Theory (ITS) because of its measurement indicators and 
components fulfil the research aims and objectives of this paper. The components are the 
implementation of security policy, risk management, internal control, information auditing, and 
contingency management in achieving organisational goals.  Other studies have used the theory in 
terms of assessing the information security implementations and integrating components that address 
 the overall security issues within an organisation. This theory has previously been employed to 
examine the effectiveness of management strategies and lack of information security management 
theory. For example it was used in studies on the information security landscape in Malaysian Public 
Service organizations  (Dzazali et al. 2009),  information security governance in Saudi organisations 
(AbuSaad et al. 2011; Shahzad & Musa 2012) and improving information security in Taiwan (Hong, 
Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2006). IST provided the basis for the research framework concerning information 
systems security (Cannoy et al. 2006; Järveläinen 2012) where it underlined the importance of 
integrating security components within an organisation to ensure that information security and 
business continuity in inter-organisational IT relationships were effective. This also includes research 
papers on the financial impact of security (Hatzakis et al. 2010) and improvement strategies in 
electronic stock commerce (Ghotbi & Gharechehdaghi 2012; Kyobe 2008). Because of the wide 
application in other critical sectors mentioned above, this particular theory,  Integrated System Theory 
(IST) is chosen to better access the overall security awareness based on the key measurement 
indicators. This research is also based a recent pilot study (Ismail et al. 2014b) that measured the 
alignment of information gathered through expert interviews, and pilot online surveys for SCADA 
systems practitioners from different organisations in different sectors of critical infrastructure. The 
survey questions were designed based on interviews conducted with experts who provided the critical 
factors to be considered during the information gathering process.  
 
 
2.3 Integrated System Theory 
 
In determining the security requirements (Igure et al. 2006) of an organisation, it is necessary to 
evaluate how organisations  approach  information sharing within the organisation  (Bishop 1995) and 
the level of confidentiality of information.  In order to ensure the security requirements are addressed, 
this study focuses on measuring the organisations’ information security goals are achieved based on 
the components adapted from Integrated System Theory. Figure 2 below shows the Research Model 
that was adapted from (Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2: Research Model-Integrated System Theory (adapted from Hong et al., 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Security Policy 
Implementing security policies is essential in organisations, especially organisations that are 
dealing with critical services. Security policy is a specific statement of what is and what is not 
allowed in terms of ensuring a system’s security (Bishop 2003; Stouffer et al. 2011).  Security 
policies are important for ensuring compliance to security practices in an organisation.  
 
H1: The availability of security policies has a positive impact on the organisational 
information security goals 
 
 Risk Management 
Vulnerabilities in a SCADA system can occur due to mismanagement of risks, misconfigurations, 
poor maintenance on platforms hardware, operating systems and applications. Risk assessment 
serves to identify, quantify and prioritize risks against criteria for risk acceptance and objectives 
relevant to an organisation, specifically to those that employ SCADA systems. The outcome of a 
risk assessment could be used to determine the appropriate action required to manage the 
information security risks to the SCADA system networks, which will then lead to appropriately 
selecting the best security controls to implement (Ismail et al. 2014b).   
  
H2: The ability to manage risks will have a positive impact on the organisational information 
security goals 
 
 Internal Control 
The third important component of Integration System Theory (IST) is control and auditing theory 
which suggests that each organisation measures the control performance of the implemented 
security control systems in their environment (Hong et al., 2003). Control is often regarded as 
preventing, detecting and correlating activities in the system in order to avoid illegal and 
unauthorised access and activities in their system (Ismail et al. 2014b). Stouffer at al. (2011) 
defines controls as management, operational and technical controls that constitute part of the 
informational system that protects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system and 
its data.  
 
H3: The ability to implement Internal Controls has a positive impact on the 
organisational information security goals. 
 
 Contingency Management 
For the purpose of this study, participants from different organisations and cross-sectors are 
evaluated in terms of awareness and whether their respective organisations are implementing 
various measures in making sure the critical services that they are providing are continued even in 
events of disturbance. This is achieved by making sure that appropriate measures are taken when 
any unforseen incidents were to happen. Contingency planning normally includes documents in 
handling equipment’s, restoring data, information on responsible personnel’s for each tasks and 
emergency operations.  
 
H4: Implementation of Contingency Management has a positive impact on the organisational 
information security goals 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 below summarises the measurement items, mean and standard deviation for the key 
dimensions.  
 
Dimensions/Questions Item Mean STD 
Security Policy 
My organisation has a specific and adequate documented security 
procedure 
SP01 3.1683 .77549 
My organisation has adequate guidelines in SCADA systems 
hardware/equipment maintenance 
SP02 3.2970 .81908 
My organisation has adequate policies for portable devices (hardware 
and software) 
SP03 3.1188 .71116 
My organisation has documented change management procedures SP04 3.1980 .72138 
My organisation has an appointed person in charge to manage security 
policies and procedures 
SP05 3.0990 .84267 
Risk Management 
Default platform configurations are used in my organisation RM01 3.0297 .95347 
Critical platform configurations are stored and backed up RM02 3.4554 .70035 
Data are stored on portable hardware drives and protected RM03 3.2871 1.00336 
Internal Controls 
My organisation implements a security assessment mechanism IC01 3.0594 .79777 
My organisation has appointed a person in charge (PIC) to conduct 
security assessments 
IC02 3.1782 .81726 
My organisation has specific plans to control and maintain security IC03 3.1188 .73874 
My organisation has a service acquisition strategy IC04 3.2079 .94145 
My organisation manages security training and awareness IC05 2.9109 .82582 
Contingency Management 
My organisation has adequate continuity of operations documentation CM1 3.2079 .75255 
My organisation has adequate disaster recovery documentation CM2 3.0891 .82582 
My organisation has installed intrusion detection software in my 
environment 
CM3 3.0594 .97798 
My organisation keeps track and ensures that all logs are maintained CM4 3.2079 .87541 
Organisational Information Security Goals 
My organisation implements adequate security policies for SCADA 
systems 
OISG1 3.317 .8594 
My organisation implements adequate security training and awareness 
policies 
OISG2 3.0198 .83642 
My organisation has procedures to provide adequate training on 
security architecture and design of the SCADA systems 
OISG3 3.0396 .95834 
Table 1: Measurement items, Mean and Standard Deviation 
 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To assist in achieving the overall objectives of this research, an online survey was created based on 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guide to Industrial Systems (ICS) Security 
(Stouffer et al. 2011). The online survey was distributed to SCADA systems practitioners across 
several sectors within the SCADA systems community of organisations. The participants were 
identified by the experts from the industry which was interviewed during the first phase of this project 
(Ismail et al. 2014b), governing bodies as well as through various methods of selective sampling 
including communicating with the organisations through email and LinkedIn. A total of 118 
practitioners from different organisations participated in the survey, but only 101 are used for the data 
analysis. Others were excluded due to their incompleteness. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the 
survey participants according to job role, department, and years of service, sectors and principal 
industry for the organisation. Most of the participants are the practitioners of SCADA systems. A high 
percentage is from the engineering department, which is consistent with the objective of the survey, 
i.e. to focus more on the practitioners (Ismail et al. 2014b) who run SCADA systems daily. 
 Information is also provided by IT personnel who ensure the security of the systems. 44.3% of 
participants have at least 1-5 years’ experience, which is well reflected in the survey findings that are 
discussed in the following section. 75.7% of participants work in the private sector which reflects the 
fact that critical services are outsourced to private businesses, and thus emphasizes the importance of 
securing and monitoring the SCADA systems to ensure the integrity and safety of data. The three 
main critical services which are utilities industries, which include oil and gas (30.4%), electricity 
(21.7%) and water (13.9%) and these, are well represented. This will ensure that the data obtained 
from the survey can represent the level of security existing in critical services.  
 
Demographics Category Percentage 
Job Role Senior Management 5.2% 
Middle Management 28.7% 
Team Leader 19.1% 
Staff 31.3% 
Contractor 7.8% 
Others 7.8% 
Department Administration 2.6% 
Engineering 62.6% 
IT   14.8% 
Facilities & Management 0.0% 
Emergency Planning / 
Management 
0.9% 
Others 19.1% 
Years of Service Less than a year 7.8% 
1-5 years 44.3% 
6-10 years 24.3% 
10-15 years 11.3% 
More than 15 years 12.2% 
Sector Government 11.3% 
Semi-Government 13.0% 
Private 75.7% 
Principal Industry Construction & Manufacturing 15.7% 
Defense (Airlines & Aerospace) 1.7% 
Telecommunications 11.3% 
Utilities (Oil and Gas) 30.4% 
Utilities (Electricity) 21.7% 
Utilities (Water) 13.9% 
Transport 5.2% 
Table 2: Respondents’ Demographic Details 
The comprehensive questionnaire consists of several sections. The first section is concerned with the 
demographics of participants. The second section focuses on the security policies implemented in the 
organisations, while the third section is about risk management implementations, in terms of platform, 
and network vulnerabilities identified in the organisation.  Section four encompasses the management, 
technical and operational controls. The final section focuses on the issues concerning security of 
SCADA systems. 
 
4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
For this research, structural equation modelling is used to examine the data collected from the survey. 
The information retrieved was tested using the partial least squares (PLS) model. The first step in 
analysing the data was to assess the measurements of the said model by establishing the reliability and 
discriminant validity. The next step was to assess the structural model by testing the hypothesized 
paths (and the path coefficient, β) between the constructs, as well as determining the path significance 
 using t statistics values by conducting a bootstrapping method with 500 samples. This will be further 
explained in the following sections.    
The measurement scale used in the survey is a Likert scale from 1-5 which ranges from: strongly 
disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), strongly disagree (4) and unable to rate (5). The information 
gathered were analysed and evaluated in SPSS 21.0. The psychometric properties of the constructs 
were assessed and by examining the internal consistency, convergent validity, composite reliability, 
and discriminant validity. Cronbach’s Alpha testing (Cronbach, 1951) was also conducted to evaluate 
the constructs consistency and reliability. This is shown in Table 3 in the following section. 
 
4.1 Assessments of Measurement Model  
Assessment of the measurement model was done by conducting reliability and validity of the 
constructs namely; security policies, risk management, internal control, contingency management and 
organisational information security goals (OISG) based on the information collected through the 
online survey answered by practitioners of SCADA systems.  
For the reliability of constructs test, we used the measurements of Cronbach’s alpha using SmartPLS 
3.1.6. It can be concluded that the reliability between the constructs is positive because it is higher 
than 0.7. If all the constructs are higher than the cut-off value of 0.7, this indicates that the constructs 
for the research have an acceptable level of internal consistency (Hair et al. 1998; Nunnally & 
Bernstein 1978). The independent variables for this research are security policy, risk management, 
internal control and contingency management, whereas the dependent variable is the OISG. The 
corresponding Cronbach’s alpha values are 0.807, 0.769, 0.844, 0.710 and 0.860, respectively, as 
stated in Table 3.    
 
Construct No. of 
items 
Cronbach’s alpha 
Security Policy (SP) 5 0.807 
Risk Management (RM) 3 0.769 
Internal Control (IC) 5 0.844 
Contingency Management (CM) 4 0.710 
Organisational Information Security 
Goals (OISG) 
3 0.860 
                              Table 3: Reliability of Constructs 
We then evaluated the convergent validity assessments of the constructs by examining the correlation 
of constructs, and determining the factor loadings and average variance extracted. Convergent validity 
stipulates the degree of a construct correlation with another construct in the research model.  For this 
test each indicator’s factor loadings should be higher on their own constructs when compared to the 
other constructs in the research model (Anderson & Gerbing 1988; Rhee et al. 2009).  On the other 
hand, discriminant validity specifies the degree to which the constructs is not correlated with another 
construct. The test that was done particularly to determine discriminant validity calculates the average 
variance extracted (AVE) which Fornell and Larcker (1981) recommended to be above 0.5, and 
composite reliability (CR) above 0.6 (Bagozzi et al. 1991) or above 0.7 (Hair et al. 2011). By 
determining the values of the factor loadings, AVE and CR are at an adequate convergent validity in 
each construct. Table 4 indicates the factor loadings for each corresponding indicator have the highest 
value and are in bold. Table 5 shows that the square root values of AVE for each construct are larger 
than the correlation with other constructs. The measures of the five constructs satisfy the conditions 
set for reliability and validity assessment. The validity test was conducted using Spearman’s Validity 
test in SPSS.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Factor Loadings for Convergent Validity 
 
 
Construct CR AVE SP RM IC CM OISG 
Security Policy .864 .562 0.749     
Risk 
Management 
.867 .684 0.489 0.827    
Internal Control .889 .616 0.529 0.350 0.784   
Contingency 
Management 
.821 .535 0.677 0.473 0.525 0.731  
Organisational 
Information 
Security Goal   
.915 .781 0.595 0.339 0.475 .0.507 0.883 
Table 5: Composite Reliability, AVE, and Inter Construct Correlations  
(Using Spearman’s Validity Test) 
 
Note: CR= Composite Reliability, AVE= Average Variance Extracted, Bold diagonal values represent the 
square root of AVE. 
 
4.2 Assessments of the Structural Model 
The second phase is to ensure that the structural model is fit and adequate by conducting analysis 
using SmartPLS and SPSS software to test the hypothesis. PLS and bootstrapping test was conducted 
to identify each hypothesized path and estimate path significance using t values. A non-parametric 
bootstrap can be used in PLS path modelling to provide intervals for parameter estimates of shape, 
spread and bias of the sampling distribution of a specific set of statistics to test coefficients for their 
significance. Bootstrapping observes a sample as a representation of a population, in which the 
procedure creates a large, pre-specified number of bootstrap samples by randomly drawing cases from 
the original sample (Henseler et al. 2009). For the purposes of this study, the sample set of 500 was 
tested due to the nature and requirement of this research. All the hypotheses were tested and the 
results were supported by the findings.  
Table 6 shows the hypothesized paths and their path coefficients, as well as the p-value and t-value, 
and the results of the findings. As stated in Table 6, the security policies implemented in organisations 
Construct Item SP RM IC CM OISG 
Security Policy SP1 0.859 0.473 0.442 0.612 0.702 
SP2 0.757 0.387 0.373 0.520 0.536 
SP3 0.685 0.320 0.306 0.508 0.416 
SP4 0.687 0.427 0.317 0.589 0.376 
SP5 0.748 0.338 0.472 0.582 0.522 
Risk Management RM1 0.391 0.808 0.183 0.365 0.320 
RM2 0.517 0.798 0.217 0.460 0.348 
RM3 0.382 0.873 0.143 0.405 0.363 
Internal Control IC1 0.396 0.101 0.820 0.412 0.385 
IC2 0.502 0.275 0.853 0.403 0.414 
IC3 0.474 0.187 0.780 0.507 0.325 
IC4 0.388 0.266 0.722 0.352 0.272 
IC5 0.277 0.055 0.740 0.358 0.397 
Contingency 
Management 
CM1 0.528 0.372 0.363 0.697 0.431 
CM2 0.634 0.433 0.349 0.780 0.468 
CM3 0.419 0.252 0.373 0.667 0.342 
CM4 0.571 0.374 0.426 0.775 0.502 
Organisational 
Information Security 
Goal  
OISG1 0.598 0.425 0.399 0.503 0.868 
OISG2 0.563 0.187 0.393 0.509 0.867 
OISG3 0.693 0.466 0.438 0.582 0.916 
 significantly influences the institution’s information security goals. The path coefficient from SP to 
OISG (β = 0.516, t=3.938, p<0.01). Thus, this findings supports Hypothesis 1. Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 
also have a positive relationship with OISG and the corresponding path coefficients; Risk 
Management to OISG (β = 0.058, t=0.602, p <0.05); Internal Control to OISG (β = 0.119, t=1.458, 
p<0.05) and Contingency Management to OISG (β = 0.129, t=0.995, p<0.05). These results support 
hypotheses 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Hypothesis Hypothesized 
path 
Path coefficient (β) P-value t-value Result 
Original Sample 
(Bootstrapping=500) 
H1 SP             OISG 0.516 0.514 P < 0.01 3.938 Supported 
H2 RM           OISG 0.058 0.057 P < 0.05 0.602 Supported 
H3 IC             OISG 0.119 0.135 P < 0.05 1.458 Supported 
H4 CM           OISG 0.129 0.125 P < 0.05 0.995 Supported 
Table 6: Results of Hypothesis Testing based on Bootstrapping Technique 
 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
Drawing on Integrated System Theory, this research demonstrated the positive relationships between 
the measurement of security policies, risk management, internal controls and contingency 
management in organisations securing their SCADA systems. The analysis in section 4 has shown 
that the four hypotheses are supported, and therefore the overall research model is valid. Referring to 
Table 6 in the previous section, Hypothesis 1 proposes that the availability of security policies has a 
positive impact on the organisational information security goals. The findings suggest that most 
organisations are aware and are implementing security policies. The findings also suggest among all 
the other constructs, security policies have the highest percentage of t value, which indicates a high 
level of path significance. Most organisations have implemented specific and adequate security 
procedures, adequate guidelines in hardware and equipment maintenance, and adequate policies for 
portable devices (hardware and software) and have documented management procedures in place. 
They have also diligently appointed a person to manage security policies and procedures. With all the 
five items used to measure the security policies in organisations, a positive relationship was observed. 
The results also confirm that by evaluating the items within Risk Management (H2), Internal Control 
(H3) and Contingency Management (H4) were also proven to have a positive relationship with 
organisational information security goals.  
H2 has the lowest path coefficient, which implies that some of the organisations that participated in 
the study are still using the default platform configurations, which is due to the complexity of the 
systems configurations. This opens up the possibility of future attacks on the system. This calls for 
efforts to increase the existing system and technology specific knowledge for the practitioners that are 
involved directly in the SCADA systems. On the other hand, most organisations believe that the 
critical platform configurations are stored and backed up, which is critical in the business continuity 
of services.  
The organisations realise the importance of implementing a security assessment mechanism internally 
(H3), and the need to appoint a person in charge to conduct regular security assessments. It is 
important to note that not all the organisations assessed realise the importance of implementing 
security assessments within the organisations. Even though security assessments is deemed  necessary 
and critical especially in the critical infrastructure environment, some participants believe that 
ICS/SCADA networks are isolated from office networks. This suggests that additional security 
mechanism measures are not always practical for industrial protocols.  Another important issue is the 
 organisation’s financial capability in procuring additional security measures or acquiring personnel’s 
that are equipped with the proper knowledge of the complex SCADA systems security. .  
H4, which refers to contingency management, is at an average where most organisations believe that 
they have adequate continuity of operations and disaster recovery documentation. Most organisational 
conflicts on the need to install an intrusion detection software are due to the nature of the system, 
which is in line with what was suggested by Hildick-Smith (2005). Although most organisations 
claimed that they keep track and ensure that all logs are maintained, several responses from the 
participants highlighted the fact that their workplace does not have sufficient monitoring and 
maintenance due to several factors. This include the fact that management is not aware and does not 
acknowledge the need for additional resources to ensure the system remains safe and secure.  
One of the limitations to this research is the amount of participants in this study. Even though 
participants are practitioners from various sectors of the SCADA systems industry, there are several 
sectors that have a low percentage of participants, such as aviation and defence. A plausible 
explanation may be the high level of confidentiality that the industry demands. The defence industry 
is seen as one the most important economic sectors that has critical infrastructure and requires a high 
degree of confidentiality.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we surveyed 101 SCADA systems organisations across several critical infrastructure 
sectors. The aim was to investigate the level of security awareness and implementation in conjunction 
with its organisational information security goals.  Integrated System Theory was implemented in 
order to evaluate the important factors in the system that influences security awareness and 
implementation, by looking at: measuring the security policies, risk management, internal control and 
contingency management factors. The integration of all components shows an undeniable influence to 
the level of organisational information security goals.  
Finally, our study confirms that the organisations that operate SCADA systems are aware of the need 
to implement and maintain a secure environment. Through the findings of the online survey, it is 
highly critical for organisations to conduct regular vulnerability and penetration tests, increase and 
develop training and awareness programs for both management, personnel, employees and 
practitioners of SCADA systems as well as providing training on security architecture and design of 
the SCADA systems. 
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